Date: Wed, 6 Nov 1996 14:45:15 -0800
From: "Rudolf Kies, PH.D."
Subject: 1205 Documents
The following "1205 Document" was submitted by a list member that wishes
to remain anonymous. It's interesting reading for those that served in
Korea and/or Vietnam. If you have questions or comments, please direct
these to the list rather than to me.
Enjoy!
Rudolf Kies, PH.D.
Owner/Moderator
on listserv@sjuvm.stjohns.edu
We don't spy on anyone - we just watch those that do...
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 6 Nov 1996 14:45:19 -0800
From: "Rudolf Kies, PH.D."
Subject: 1205 Document 1 of 3
Text of The Quang or '1205' Document
Handwritten note on cover memo from Pyotr Ivashutin, head of Soviet
Military Intelligence (GRU) states:
"Please prepare a short report (special delivery) for the Politiburo
of the TsK KPSS (Central Committee of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union) about the Prisoners of War."
signed,
Katushev*
(* Konstantin Katushev was a Secretary of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party who handled relations with communist countries)
Apr-20-1993 18:26 From Task Force Russia TO DIA P.02
Top Secret
Copy No. 1
[Stamp "TsK KPSS
1 Dec 72 38995
Subject to Return
To the General Section
of the TsK KPSS"]
[handwritten "15/D12"]
TsK KPSS (Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union)
I am reporting:
Translation of the report of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff,
Vietnamese People's Army, General-Lieutenant Chan Van Kuang (Tran Van
Quang), at the Politiburo session, Tsk PTV (Central Committee of the
workers' Party of Vietnam), 15 September 1972.
This report outlines the measures which are being carried out by the
leadership of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in South
Vietnam to develop opportunities for cooperation with and for the
recruitment of representatives of the Saigon government and army to
the side of the Patriots. With this in mind, contacts have been
established and meetings conducted with several civilian and military
leaders, to include generals Ngo Din' Dzu (Commander, 2nd regional
Corps), Nguen Khan and Zyong Van Min' (former leader of the Saigon
administration), Khoang Suan Lam (former Commander, 1st Regional
Corps) and others.
According to the speaker, during these meetings many of the generals
have spoken against the Tkhieu (Thieu) regime and against the U.S.
policy of "Vietnamization", have acknowledged the major victories of
the Patriotic forces and also agreed to be part of the future
coalition government for South Vietnam. The leadership of the DRV is
convinced that even though they have anticommunist views, such people
will be able to greatly assist the Patriots in overthrowing the Thieu
dictatorship and in forming a coalition government.
Tran Van Quang has presented the contents of the plan "Ba Be" which is
planned for execution in South Vietnam. This plan envisions the
resolution of a number of tasks, the principle one of which is the
physical extermination of the reactionary leaders of the Saigon
administration who have harshly criticized DRV policy.
The development of plan "Ba Be" was undertaken jointly by the DRV
Ministry of National Defense along with the Ministry of State
Security. They were assinged responsibility for the magament of its
execution.
It was noted that preparation for execution of "Ba Be" is going
successfully. Up until the middle of September of this year, 406
people, who have recieved special training and know the local
conditions well, have been sent from the DRV to south Vietnam. These
people were also assigned the task of carrying out operations
according to plan "Ba Be". The insertion into South Vietnam of
specially trained agents is scheduled for completion by the end of
September.
The report states that conduct of operations in accordance with plan
"Ba Be" is scheduled for October of this year. It is assumed that its
successful execution will assist in the realization of plans for
combat operations to a significant degree and will lead to the
development of an improved situation in South Vietnam for the
Patriots. In addition, substantial influence will be exerted on the
negotiations in Paris.
Tran Van Quang explained the American POW issue in detail. The total
number of American POWs captured in combat actions and who are now in
the DRV consists of 1205, of which 671 were taken prisoner in North
Vietnam, 426 in South Vietnam, 43 in Laos and 65 in Cambodia.
There are 767 aviators among the prisoners, 3 of which went through
training for space flights, and 15 of which have more than 4000 flight
hours each.
All of the American POWs are held in 11 prisons and were assigned
according to military rank (there are 16 colonels, 104 lieutenant
colonels, 235 majors and the remaining prisoners are of lower rank).
It was noted that during the interrogations of the prisoners, the NVA
command succeeded in collecting valuable information on the US Armed
Forces on combat equipment and various types of weaponry, including
chemical weapons, which provides the opportunity to develop
countermeasures against the enemy.
According to the speaker, the US government does not know the precise
number of POWs in the DRV since the NVA command holds this information
in strict secrecy. Up until now, a list of only 368 prisoners has been
published officially. There are indications that the leadership of the
DRV considers the issue of releasing American POWs as a part of the
whole Vietnamese problem and can be settled only after the resolution
of the political and military issues.
Enclosures:
1 brochure (entry No. 14253), Top Secret, Copy No. 6.
[Signature] P. Ivashutin
P. Ivashutin
"29" November 1972
N 313/001286
RKSS/I 2242-24.II.72
GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE USSR
MAIN INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE (GRU)
Copy No. 6
REPORT
OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE
VNA [VIETNAMESE PEOPLES ARMY] GENERAL-LIEUTENAT CHAN
VAN KUANG
(TRAN VAN QUANG) AT THE POLITIBURO MEETING OF THE TSK
PTV
15 SEPTEMBER 1972
(translation from Vietnamese into Russian)
Moscow - 1972
Dear Comrades: I reported to you earlier about the situation which has
developed, about the fundamental characteristics of the past stage of
our people's conflict against American imperilists. I will dwell on
the main tasks of the people and the army of North and South Vietnam
which were proposed by the 23rd Plenum of the Tsk PTV.
These tasks once again confirm our resoluteness to attain victory.
This a very correct course for our party and people in the
contemporary stage of conflict. We have already worked out measures
for the realizing the resolutions of the 23rd Plenum of the TsK. We
will also dwell on a number of the Supreme Command's and the
Government Defense Council's positions, in which an evaluation of our
victories gained over the period from 30 Mar 72 to the present is
given.
The military situation for us is developing favorably on all fronts. A
number of profound changes which took place in the military situation
demanded that we develpo a necessary point of view for solving all
issues which comes up during the war. Several meetings between us and
the US aimed at developing measures of resolving the Vietnam issue
have already taken place.
We have decisively rejected a number of proposals put forth by the
American side. With assistance from a number of countries, there
should have been secret meetings in Paris and in other places aimed at
drawing up a solution to the Vietnam issue. Such meetings took place.
They once again testified to the deranged nature of the proposals put
forth by the American side. As previously, we have maintained our
position, the essence of which includes the following: if the US truly
wants to resolve the Vietnam issue, then above all else it must refuse
to support the Nguyen Van Thieu regime, and only afterwards will we
engage in a discussion about a cease fire. This demand is the main
tenet in our conflict against the American imperialists.
If Nixon continues adhering to his policy of "Vietnamization" of the
war and desires to leave the present Saigon Government of Thieu in
power, then the peace negotiations between us and the US will not
yeild any results.
During our general offensive on the fronts of South Vietnam, Laos and
Cambodia, the progress which we have attained in implementing our
strategic and tactical line (direction, orientation) was clearly
evident.
I earlier analyzed the activity of our command, elucidated the great
victories we have attained and I also explained the shortcomings and
mistakes that we made during the general offensive. The lessons we
learned from analyzing the mistakes we made were also discussed. I
stated all of this to the Politiburo in order to work out a direction
for solving the fundamental priciple problems.
Today I will report a number of positions regarding expanding the
scope of our future offensive.
We organized meetings with South Vietnamese representatives aimed at
preparing a solution of the military and political in South Vietnam
according to the Politiburo's and State Defense Council's plan, we
organized meetings with South Vietnamese representatives . These
meetings have great significance for us, and we are affiliating
several of our plans with them [South Vietnamese representatives]. A
number of our comrades have met with representatives of the South
Vietnamese authorities, and it can be said that we have succeeded in
winning their sympathy at these meetings. We were able to exchange
ideas not only orally, but also in written form during these meetings
and contacts. This gave us the opportunity to draw definate
conclusions. Recently, we have conducted 8 similar meetings with
representatives of the Saigon authorities and South Vietnamese
political figures.
First, we will dwell on meetings with General Ngo Dinh Dzu.(1) Earlier
Ngo Dinh Dzu was listed as a candidate for president of South Vietnam
and battled with Nguen Van Thieu and Nguen Kao Ki for this post. Ngo
Dinh Dzu is a prominent Sout Vietnamese capitolist and well known
political figure. He occupied the post of chairman of the upper
chamber of the Saigon Parliment and during the Ngo Dinh Diem
government, he was a senator in the upper chamber. Ngo Dinh Dzu, in
his own opinion, is a nationalist. He speaks against American troops
on South Vietnamese territory, and also against several policy
positions conducted by the Saigon authorities. AT the same time, he is
characterized as a reactionary, an enemy of communism. Afterwards, as
Ki and Thieu attained victory in the presidential elections, the
latter undertook all measures to take revenge on General Dzu. Dzu used
the pre-electioncampaign to criticize the Saigon regime and to
undermine its security. He spoke against American troops on South
Vietnamese territory, for which he was subjected to bitter attacks
from Nguen Van Thieu. General Dzu was forced to leave the political
arena after 9 months under pressure from Thieu. Afterwards, General
Dzu became an even greater enemy of the Nguen Van Thieu and his
government. This why we tried to attract this person to our side.
(1) Commander of the 2nd Regional Corps of South Vietnam, General
Lieutenant (GRU's note).
Despite General Dzu remaining an enemy of communism, his relations
with Nguen Van Thieu and the present Saigon alignments, and also our
meetings with him have allowed him to see the nature of the Americans
and the present face of the Saigon government.
We sent one of our comrades from the Supreme Command to Saigon for
meetings with General Dzu. At the meeting, which lasted 3 hours,
General Dzu agreed to enter into a future coalition government and
spoke out against the policy of "Vietnamization" of the war carried
out by Nixon and also against the Nguen Van Thieu clique. During this
meeting he also stated that he will fight against Nguen Van Thieu's
clique and Nixon's present designs.
Now, we see well how significant changes have taken place in General
Dzu's life and way of thinking. He is already not the same ardent
anticommunist. In his views, now prevail those features such as the
conflict against Nixon's policy of "Vietnamization" of the war and
against Nguen Van Thieu's clique which he considers as fascist and as
expressing the interests of the financial oligarchy which is against
freedom and independence. And, finally, General Dzu is for the
expansion of democracy and freedom over the entire territory of South
Vietnam. These are the main national traits of General Dzu, which
correspond to our present course. This is whay we are attempting to
attract General Dzu to our side and why we entered into contact with
him. After the first meeting, there were recently three other meetings
during which he spoke his opinions. During these meetings, we
understood what kind of major changes took place in his way of
thinking and in the position he has taken and in his approach to
solving the problem.
Thus, we can ascertain that these meetings and contacts with General
Dzu had very good results. Recentyl, General Dzu requested to meet
with one of the prominent leaders of the NFO [National Liberation
Front] of South Vietnam. We are now busy preparing for the upcoming
meeting between General Dzu and Khyuin' Tan Fat. This meeting will be
conducted secretly in order to insure the fulfillment of our main
principles because we understand that this new person expresses
contradictions - he is amog those in the Saigon government whose
number is growing every day.
The second person is Nguen Khan' who earlier occupied the prime
minister post for three years after the overthrow of Ngo Din' Diem.
Nguen Khan' is a representative of the army. Earlier he served in the
French Army; now he is a prominent South Vietnamesecapitolist whose
capitol is invested in various foreign enterprises, especially in
France, Nguen Khan' is a representative of the new trend. This is why
we have entered into contact with him. These contacts took place in
Paris, where we have conducted 5 meetings.
Nguen Khan' maintains constant contact with military circles in the
Nguen Van Thieu government. After being removed from his post, he left
the country, but periodically returns to Saigon where he engages in
political activities in the capacity of an emigree representative.
In summarizing the five meetings, we noticed in Nguen Kkhan the
following: first, as regards the ruling faction he believes that Nguen
Van Thieu is a dictator and a fascist who is not capable of being head
of the government. Khan' considers the present government to be rotten
to the core; second, he is against the bombing of North Vietnam;
third, while criticizing the Nguen Van Thieu faction, he speaks
against the participation of Saigon troops in combat actions on
Cambodia territory. He believes that the threat of disintergration has
arisen over the Saigon ARmy, that it has poor morale and combat
spirit. Nguen Khan' speaks for the establishment of a new government
which would have authority with the people which would carry out a
nationalist policy, while recieving foreign aid. These are the views
of Nguen Khan'. He says nothing about his feelings toward the policy
of "Vietnamization" of the war. This explained, first of all, by his
connections with military circles. Therefore, we are not striving to
directly attract him to our side. Presently, Nguen Khan' is
maintaining connections with the current Saigon generals.
The third person is Zyong Van Min', who also represents the military
circles. Previously, he occupied the prime minister post after Nguen
Khan', and was sent out of the country as an ambassador. The political
views of Zyong Van Min' differ from the political views of Nguen
Khan'. This is first expressed Zyong Van Min' speaking out against
Nixon's policy of "Vietnamization" and for the independent solution
internal problems by the Vietnamese without US interference. He
believes that the US should carry responsibility for drawing out the
Vietnamese War and for its consequences. He subjects the Vietnamese
policy of Nixon to sharp critisism, and also the policy carried out by
the current Saigon government. These are very good political views. He
speaks against Thieu's clique, considering it to be pre-fascist,
anti-democratic and not capable of carrying the leadershipo of the
country. These are the main political views of Zyong Van Min'.
As a result of these contacts with Zyong Van Min', we have attained an
important victory, forcing him to reflect. He also met with Nguen Tkhi
Bin' several times in Paris. At these meetings, Zyong Van Min' felt
that he as before was close to the Fatherland and that he is
Vietnamese. This is why he began to conduct this great work with us
and with the intelligentsia and military circles located outside of
the country, with the aim of entering into a coalition government and
in the hope of solving the Vietnamese issue on the basis of conducting
consultations and negotiations between the various political factions
of South Vietnam. This is Zyong Van Min's desire.
The fourth person is the former emporor Bao Daj. At one time the
possibility exsisted that the former emporor would have been behind
us. But, under pressure from reactionary factions after the August
revolution, he was forced to emigrate to France. As before, Bao Daj
holds great influence amongst the political figures in the Kyang-Chu
and Tkxya-Tkxien Provinces, and also in the city of Gyeh, the ancient
capitol of Vietnam. This why we moved to make contact with Bao Daj. We
are not hoping that Bao Daj becomes part of the coalition government,
but to attract him to our side is to attract his supporters in the
regions where he has influence. As a result of the meetings conducted,
we clarified that Bao Daj will come out against the presence of
American troops in the territory of South Vietnam, and also critisizes
Nguen Van Thieu's exsisting regime. Bao Daj is also calling for all of
the political factions to create a free, neutral, peace-loving
government that would resolve the tense situation that has taken form
in the country. This is whay we entered into contact with Bao Daj and
are trying to attract him to our side. We hope that he, in turn, will
work with his people in a plan for securing peace and freedom for our
country.
The fifth person is General Nguen Van Vi who earlier occupied the post
of Minister of Defense of South Vietnam. Tkhieu removed him from the
post for disorder and chaos in the army's financial affairs. The real
reason, however, for Nguen Van Vi's retirement was the series of
serious defeats that the puppet army has suffered. From Nguen Van
Tkhieu's viewpoint, the military circles responded to this move with
specific reaction. We also had contacts with General Nguen Van Vi
which allowed us to understand his political position. He thinks that
the US will certainly suffer defeat in this war and that a war in
Vietnam is not the responsibility of the American Army. This is why
Nguen Van Vi is also coming out for the creation of a coalition
government in order to resolve the Vietnam issue through peaceful
negotiation between all of the political factions of South Vietnam.
Nguen Van Vi is also coming out against Nixon's "Vietnamization" of
the war. Such are the basic political views of General Nguen Van Vi.
We scored a great victory at the meeting with him; we received his
agreement to take part in a coalition government to resolve the
Vietnam issue through peaceful negotiation between all of the
political factions of South Vietnam. Nguen Van Vi also officially
recognized the victories won by the National Liberation Front of South
Vietnam, i.e. our victories.
As concerns our contacts within the South Vietnamese governing
apparatus, it is fitting to mention here the letter from Nuguen Kao Ki
addressed to our address. In the letter, he lays out his views on the
route to a resolution of the Vietnam problem.
I have reported to you today on the contact with all of these people
so that you would know how the Politburo's instructions on the
recruitment of these people to our side is being carried out.
The srtong protest from their side is a result of a growth of
contradictions within Nguen Van Tkhieu's clique and of contradictions
of Nixon's "Vietnamization: of the war. We can use these
contradictions to improve the situation in South Vietnam, to resolve
the issue in our favor, and the agreement of these people to enter
into a coalition government will precisely go in our favor. In
addition to a resolution of the issue by military means on the
battlefields of South Vietnam, we have engaged in contacts with
several South Vietnamese political figures, who may be able to join
the ranks of a coalition government. As a result of these contacts we
have gained an understanding of the political views of these people
and have expressed our point of view on ways to resolve the Vietnam
problem.
These contacts with people who occupy high stations, prominent
military and political figures, ministers and senators of the upper
and lower chambers of the saigon parliament give the basis for making
the following conclusions:
1. They are against the present regime of Nguen Van Tkhieu,
considering that, Nguen Van Tkhieu's clique is dictatorial,
profascist, rotten and not capable of carrying out the leadership of
the country under the situation that has developed in South Vietnam at
the present. They also think that if the US withdraws its troops from
South Vietnam and stops aiding the regime, the government would
instantly fall to pieces.
2. The majority of them are against Nixon's "Vietnamization" of the
war, against the broadening of the bombing of North Vietnam, and think
that Nixon does not want to resolve the Vietnam issue or the Indochina
issue as a whole.
3. They consider that the National Liberation Front has recently
scored enormous victories on the military, political and were able to
win over extensive heavily prpluated regions. They also recongnize the
National Liberation Front's great success with the strengthening of
the army, the increase in its conbat ability and leadership level, the
improvement in cooperation between the branches of service and many
other areas.
In the provinces and in many towns amongst the people who occupy less
improtant positions in the state apparatus, we also tried to win over
this catergory of people to our side. It is possible to say that they
are also ready to ais in the creatioon of a coalition government. They
are also against the policy of "Vietnamization:, against Nguen Van
Tkhieu's clique and want to resolve the Vietnamese issue on the basis
of a cessation of war.
Thus, on the orders of the Politbguro we have been preparing to
conduct meetings with various catergories of the South Vietnamesse
population, aimed at resolving the South Vietnamese issue through
peaceful negotiations between all of the political factions of South
Vietnam. As a result of the contacts that have taken place to recruit
these people to our side, conditions have presented themselves so that
these people will be able to aid us in the creation of a coalition
government and in the overthrow of Nguen Van Tkhieu's dictatorial
regime. We see that we have chosen the correct course. This is also
clearly indicated in the resolutions of the 23rd Plunum of the Central
Committee.
In other words, we should recruit these people to our side, and bring
them into the coalition government so that we use them to our favor in
the diplomatic and political plan. In order to create a base for the
successful resolution of the issues that stand before us, we
epecifically want to bring into the coalition government those people
who earlier worked in the South Vietnamese state apparatus and held or
are holding at the present a high post in the power structure.
If we are successful in resolving these issues, we will be concluding
a mammoth case on which we will again report to the Politburo so that
you are well informed on these issues and have formed a plan of
acction for mission completion. Thanks to these meetings, we are able
to know who supports us and who is against us in South Vietnam. We
have also worked out a new plan for the realization of our new
intentions in South Vietnam and now know which representatives of the
present South Vietnam power apparatus are in favor of the war.
The meetings and contacts which we initiated were conducted with
complete equality of rights and helped us recruit representatives of
all strata of South Vietnamese society to our side. This is our
grandest victory, won in the course of these contactrs with the aim of
resovling the Vietnamese issue.
Thus, thanks to these contacts we understand which part of the
popluation considers the course we are taking to be just i.e. we have
exposed all of those who are against Nixon's politics for the
prolongation of the war. against Nguen Van Tkhieu's clique and will
join with us in the creation of a coalition government.
In addition to the military issues, this is one of the problems we are
trying to resolve. We are therefore conducting these meetings and
contacts directed at the resolution of political and diplomatic
problems.
With the goal of realizing these aims, the Supreme Command, in
conjunction with the Governmental Council of Defense, has developed
directives for the army to prepare and conduct the "Ba Be" plan, which
is scheduled to be executed in October. The "Ba Be" plan provides for
the resolution of a number of problems. Four hundred and six
individuals were sent to execute the plan in South Vietnam. These
individuals had gone through sufficient preparation and well armed.
Earlier these people worked in the South Vietnam goverment apparatus.
After the August revolution, during the resistance war against the
French colonials, these people were left behind by us to active work
with the enemy and therefore enter into the staff of various organs of
the Saigon government apparatus. Prior to departure for South Vietnam,
we prepared and armen them well for the fulfillment of the "Ba Be"
plan.
The basic tasks of the "Ba Be" are: - elimination of all people: who
are stubborn and oppose our course; who occupy leadership positions in
the realm of the province uezd and above; a full paralyzation of the
wills of these people; - conduct of activities for carrying out
discruption in the Saigon governement apparatus. [installation] of new
people at the next shift of this apparatus. We are attentively
observing the people who oppose us with our decision with regards to
this group must be very serious and firm. This matter occupies an
imprtant place in carrying out the "Ba Be" plan. We must have lists of
these people and full dossiers on them beforehand to conduct
preparatory training in carrying out the plan in order to quickly do
away with them and ruin their order; - search and acquire materials
testifying to the crimes of the Americans and their puppets with
regards to the Vietnamese people, so that during opportune conditions
we may accuse them of the perpetration of these crimes by means of
publishing the materials.
These are the three basic missions of the people for carrying out of
the "Ba Be" plan. As for the time of completion, general opinion is
that it will be completed simultanqously with Plan T8-6 (Chyong
Shon-6)*, that is, in the month of October. This plan must be well
carried-out in order to infulence the course of the Paris Peace talks
on Vietnam and the development of conditions in the near future. This
is a very important task, the decision of which may help us carry out
a more successful attack on the front, the pace of development of
which we need to increase in oder to achieve great victories in short
amounts of time. Therefore the "Ba Be" plan is already being
implemened and we are continuing the trainging of people to realize
it.
(* Plan T8-6 - a military action plan of the VNA in South Vietnam with
a focus on the basic strengths in the Gueh region (GRU note.)
The pace must be increased to realize this plan. We have to quickly
throw these people from North to South Vietnam in order to destroy a
large amount of the enemy's kinetic energy from within. In other
words, the elimination of all traitors, reactionaries, and
counter-revolutionariess, who currently make up a fairly significant
portion in South Vietnam is an imprtant task to the "Ba Be" plan.
We must attract the neutral forces to our side; those who are fighting
for national independense; against the USA; forces who earlier fought
against the regime of Ngo Din' Dhiem and now fight against the regime
of Nguen Van Tkhieu. We must to do everything necessary in order to
successfully carry out the "Ba Be" plan.
Along with that, we must work for the demoralization of the puppet
army on all fronts. The conduct of such work in good conditions will
bring down the fighting sprit of the puppet army soldiers in the
future, and increase the number of servicemen who cross over to our
side. This is a basic fundamental which helps us to create conditions
for revolts in the puppet army. We were faced with this matter after
the victory in Quang-Chi.
Anonymous
Rudolf Kies, PH.D.
Owner/Moderator
on listserv@sjuvm.stjohns.edu
We don't spy on anyone - we just watch those that do...
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 6 Nov 1996 14:46:07 -0800
From: "Rudolf Kies, PH.D."
Subject: 1205 Document 2 of 3
Was ther actually a collective anti-military uprising in the 56th
puppet regiment? No, in actuality the matter at the front was not like
that. After being surrounded by us, the upper echolon of the 241st
Regimental command understood the futility of further resistance and
along with their soldiers, surrendered. However, with the goal of
increasing the effect of this work, we revealed that as a result of
the good emplyment of propoganda work, there was an anti-military
uprising the the 56th regiment. This is the new form of stimulation
anti-military uprisings in the puppet army.
The political views of puppet army officers captain and above are very
reactionary. Previously they were officers or speak out for the
prvious Saigon goverment, inciting couter-revolution and
anti-nationalism, and hating the revolution. Therefore, the conduct of
propaganda among soldiers and especially the officer corps is a
difficult and varied work, demanding study from all sides and a
creative approach in the choice of methods and means.
One must be aware of the shining results which we achieved in the past
in the propaganda organization among the High Command staff right up
to Saigon Army generals.
We had contacts and meetings with a series of officers. For example,
with General Khoang Suan Lam, the former Commander of the 1st Corp
region. He was very reactionary man and came out against our
revolution. After the defeat at Kuang-Chi Tkhieu dismissed him and he
contacted us. At the meetings, Khoang Suan Lam told us, if one must
say, a number of his views. In his opinion, the Saigon puppet army
will not be able to carry out missions, led by the plan of the
'vietnamization' of its forces. He believes that the revolutionary
forces will gain the victory and that the puppet army will not be able
to stop it. The Tkhieu regime is a dictatorship, pro-fascist, and
doesn't have the support of the people. These are some of the basic
attitudes spoken by General-Lieutenant Khoang Suan Lam.
As for the closest person to the Tkhieu regime, General Ngo Din' Dzu,
he expressed, at the meetings arranged between us, the opinion that
even the 2nd Corps regions will be lost and that no matter what the
cost, the puppet army will not be able to stand against us in this
region, ie: the Taj-Nguen region. In this way, Dzu also expresses the
idea of Khoang Suan Lam. He also said that the puppet army will not be
able to stand against us uf the Americans leave Vietnam. Ngo Din' Dzu
sees a growth of rebellion and revolution in South Vietnam, an
increase in authority for the National Front for the Freedom of South
Vietnam, an increase in the level of our strategic and tactical
leadship, and even [an increase] in the level of military action. Dzu
remembers Nguen Van Tkhieu as a bloody dictator, a fascist, as one who
reated a regime that is absolutely anti-democratic.
In This way, we see that these meetings with the generals are our
greatest victory and will aid us. In order to successfully cope with a
resolution of this matter, tied in with the use of propaganda among
the generals of the South Vietnamese Army with the goal of awakening
their conscious and attracting them to our side necessary to
understand that the outcome of the coming battle depends upon the
solution of these important questions. It is necessary to attain a
clear understanding among the generals of the fact that the Thieu
regime never will employ popular support and cannot exist. Such are
the fundamental questions which we should resolve in the near future.
>From the utterances of the generals set forth above, we see that the
situation is developing in a direction gavorable to expand the net of
communicatioons and connections with people who will carry out Plan
"BA BE." The Supreme Command and Ministry of State Security discussed
all matters related to successful implementation of this plan and
levied new tasks upon the commands of the combat zones responsible for
implementation of all regions and now are conducting the final work in
order to complete preparatroy measures for this Plan by September 30th
of this year. In comparison to other plans, the preparatioon of Plan
"BA BE" is developing will. Such a plan we will formost ring into
being on the territory of South Vietnam. In the course of its
realization we will acquire experience which can help us counter the
designs of the enemy at the front.
However more cruel the bombings and barrages of the enemy may become,
so much greater the victory we should grasp at the front, just such
victories ais realization of Plan "BA BE." With the implementation of
this plan we join great hopes; especially in accelerating the pace at
which the offensive at the front develops, of which I reported to you
above. The favorable development of the situation will be a huge and
significant factor in collapse of military desgns of the USA and of
the puppets at the front in South Vietnam. We must thwart the
tickheaded and treacherous plans of the enemy, successful carrying out
of Plan "BA BE" will indeed help us to grasp new victories. These
victories will have great strategic significance in implementation of
Plans T8-6 and 1) Plan S-6, which were topics above.
The goal of Plan "BA BE" is introduction of division into the ranks of
the enemy and lowering of his will to resist. Successful
implementation of Plan "BA BE" will help us to attain successes at the
Paris negotiations on Vietnam. The closer is victory, so much more
clearly will appear the treacherous designs of the
Nixon-Kissinger-Laird clique, and likewise of the puppet government of
Nguyen Van Thieu. Therefore implementation of Plan "BA BE" will be
great step in the resolution of many issues in the current situation.
Because of this, its significance is so great.
For successful realization of this plan we should as so as possible
deploy our forces, in order to approach implementation of this plan in
the month of October in accordance with indicated deadlines.
In the Paris negotiations on Vietnam we have met in recent days with a
series of difficulites. These difficulites are explained by the fact
that Nixon begin stubborn as before and is trying above all to achieve
amilitary solution of the issu and only then to move to settlement of
political issues, which exercises great influence on the course of
developement of the situation in Vietnam. As a result of the exchange
of opions in the private meetings with Nixon's advisor, Kissinger, we
understood that Nixon as before is being stubborn on settling the
situation which is developing today in Vietnam. To attain settlement
we should conduct careful preparation to counter Nixon's designs. Let
him understand: if he does not renounce this war, then precisely the
USA will suffer defeat in it. However, Nixon is being stubborn in
continuing aggressive war and maintaining the status quo. That is why
we think, that with the USA taking such a position, peaceful solution
of the Vietnamese question is not possible. We see that the USA
obstinately continues aggression, while Nguyen Van thieu as before
holds to his insolent position. That is why we are filled with
resolution to carry out Plan "BA BE," the realization of which will be
a turning point in the settlement of the situation at the front.
This would be our first military thrust on the front aimed at
resolving the complicated political issue at the present stage. Until
this, the Supreme Command had never tried woking out a plan simial to
the plan "Ba Be".
Over the course of Six months, we prepared to execute this plan.
During this time, we gathered everyone who should take part in its
realization, and then conducted a thorough training with them. The
intelligence directorate of the Ministry of National Defence and the
Ministry of State Security conducted the training of these people. We
well understand that the better the training of these people is
conducted, the fewer the losses we will carry and the faster we will
be able to attain execution of this plan.
Thus, once again evaluating the plan "Ba Be", the thorough training
which is now going on, and which will be realized jointly with the
plan T8-6 in October, it can be said that its successful
realizationwill assist us to attain new large victories at the Paris
negotiations on Vietnam. These are very serious issues which we must
devote constant attention to.
Yesterday the State Defense Council directed the Supreme Command to
conduct a conference for the cadres responsible for training and
carrying out his plan. At this conference, the forms, means and
methods were stated, which were worked out. According to the organs
and confirmed at a Politburo session.
Now we can say that we have achieved great successes and we are
convinced that this plan will be realized. Presently, this plan is
being carried out. We have already suceeded in inserting a portion of
our comrades into South Vietnamese territory. Wee succeeded with
difficulty in certain areas and for this we had to procure all
possible means. In other areas, this operation was carried out more
successfully, and now our people are occuping stable positions in the
puppet governing apparatus.
Dear Comrades! In summing up what is stated above, it can be said that
we are going in the right direction in carrying out our plans,
especially the plans T8-6 and "Ba Be", and also in training for the
realization of our plan s-6, the realization of which is stated for
the near future.
In addition to these issues, in accordance with the instructions from
the Politburo, I will also report to you today on American POWs
captured on the various fronts of Indochina.
The work with American prisoners of war has always been within the
field of vision of the Politburo and has been reflected in its
decisions, such as decision No. 21 DST Dated 23 Mar 71, and decision
No. 21 E dated 4 Apr 72. Both of these decisions concern the issues of
exploiting these American POW issue. Some of these are correct, other
are not, but even among us there are a number of comrades whose
opinions differ from the opionion of Politburo. These comrades are not
taking into consideration the particulars of the developing situation
not the inherent difficulties in their judgements. These opinion harm
us in our search for methods of resolving the American POW issue.
Dear comrades! The American POW issue to very complex. The peoples of
the world [world opinion] and the peoples of our fraternal socialist
nations [allied popular opinion] as well as North Vietnam. Allow me to
inform you specifically on this matter. We have captured a very large
number of American POWs on the fronts of Indochina since the time that
the US introduced their troops into Vietnam, escalated the air war
against North Vietnam, and expanded the total scope of their
appreassion by spreading this aggression onto the territories of Laos
and Cambodia. At first, the number of American POWs was not large and
world public opinion paid little attention to them. The number of
Americal POWs in North Vietnam grew day by day after 5 Aug 65 when the
US imperialists started massive air bombing and off-shore bombardment
by the 7th fleet of the territory of North Vietnam, and after having
expanded their aggression onto the territories of Laos and Cambodia.
The number of American POWs in the DRV has not been made public to
this day. We have kept this figure secret. At today's Politburo
session, I will report to you, Comrades, the exact number of American
POWs.
For Official Use Only
The total number of American POWs captured to date on the fronts of
Indochina, ie in North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia,
comprises 1205 people. Of them, 671 people were captured in North
Vietnam and 143 aviators [were captured] in South Vietnam. This means
the total number of aviators, and diversionists (special operations)
(American advisors on diversionary ships and divers), captured on the
territories of North and South Vietnam comprises 814 people. In
addition, from other categories of American servicemen in Indochina,
we have captured 391 people, including: 283 in South Vietnam, 65 in
Cambodia and 43 in Laos; 814 and 391 comprises 1205 people.
Here is more data on the 1205 POWs.
We have captured 624 American aviators in North Vietnam, to include 7
colonels, 85 lieutenant colonels, 183 majors, ie the total number of
senior US Air Force and Navy officiers comprises 275 people. The 624
American aviators include 3 astronauts, i.e. three people who have
completed the necessary training for space flight, for instance, Jim
Katlo, who was captured in the vicinity of Hanoi. This figure also
includes 15 US Air Force aces having more than 4000 flight hours each:
Norman Klarvisto, Karmet, Jim Intist Shasht and others. This is the
specific data on American aviators captured in North Vietnam.
Among the other 47 prisoners captured in North Vietnam, there are 36
advisors of diversionary detachments who were inserted in the border
region between the DRV and Laos; lone diversionists who were
conducting reconnaissance ships; and several seamen who abandoned
their ships that were damaged and whom we picked up. Therefore the
figures 624 and 47 add up to 671.
In South Vietnam we have captured 143 US aircrew members, mainly
helicopter aviators and some jet aviators.
Among the 391 American POWs captured in South Vietnam, Laos and
Cambodia, we have 9 colonels, 19 lieutenant colonels and 52 majors.
The remaining officers are captain and below, as well as American
enlisted soldiers.
Thus in summary, I want to remind you again that the 1205 American
POWs presently in prisons of North Vietnam include:
-624 aviators captured in North Vietnam
-143 aviators captured in South Vietnam
-47 diversionarists and other American servicemen captured in
North Vietnam;
-391 American servicemen of other categories, which includes 283
captured in South Vietnam, 65 in Cambodia, and 43 in Laos.
All of them are presently in prisons in North Vietnam. Currently we
have 11 prisons where American POWs are held. We used to have 4 large
prisons, however after the American attempt to free their POWs from
Kha-Tej (Son Tay) we expanded this number to 11. Each prison holds
approximately 100 POWs.
Seven Air Force colonels captured in North Vietnam and nine colonels
of various branches of service captured in South Vietnam, Laos and
Cambodia (16 officers in all) are being held together; through them,
we are attempting to gain an understanding of the current situation
which has developed in the American Army, extract the material and
information we need, and determine our position toward them.
We are also holding 104 American lieutenant colonels in one location
and are attempting to extract information - secret information about
troop dispositions and information concerning the US Defense
Department from them.
We have 235 majors concentrated in two locations.
Thus we have dedicated special prisons for senior officers of the
American Army: one for colonels, one for lieutenant colonels and two
for majors. The rest of the POWs, captains and below, were placed in
other prisons.
A few words about the political views and attitudes of American POWs.
There are 368 POWs who have progressive attitudes.
They understand very well that this war is unjust and unpopular on
their part. They condemn the American administration and express a
strong protest against this war. We will be able to release these 368
POWs first, if as a result of the struggle of the progressive peoples
of the world, including the American people, a favorable international
environment will develop, forcing Nixon to move toward a resolution of
the political issue. We are carrying out work with this catergory of
POWs to explain to them the aggressive nature of the war being
conducted by the regime, and also to make them understand the unjust
character of this war which is inflicting great damage on the American
people. One can assert that this group of POWs is progressive in their
political views.
There are 372 of the POWs who hold neutral views, i.e. their political
outlook is not fully progressive, yet not too reactionary. We plainly
see that they still do not clearly understand the role of the American
administration in unleashing the aggressive war in Indochina.
The remainder of the POWs hold reactionary views. In spite of the work
carried on to explain to them the real state of things, they have not
changed their reactionary views.
The following is a summation: - - 368 POWs holding progressive views
can be released first;
- - 372 POWs hold neutral positions;
- - 465 POWs hold reactionary views.
All the POWs among the senior officers hold reactionary views, i.e.
they do not condmn Nixon, they do not protest his policies, and they
distort our course of action. We understand that these officers come
from rich families. Their reactionary views are precisely a result of
this.
We well understand that the American POW issue has great significance
for the resolution of the South Vietnamese problem. We must continue
propagandistic and educational work with the American POWs, leading to
their understanding of the nature of the aggressive war which the US
is carrying out in Vietnam, as well as the senseless obstinateness of
Nixon, which only delays the release of POWs and their return to their
homeland. Soon we will free several POWs in order to put pressure on
the Nixon administration, observe this reaction and the reaction of
the American public, as well as to demonstrate our good intentions in
this matter.
Thus, the 1205 American POWs captured on the fronts of Indochina (in
North and South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia), presently kept in prisons
in North Vietnam represent a significant force in the American army, a
basic part of which is made up of American aviators.
The large number of American aviators imprisoned during the time of
Johnson and Nixon inflicted huge damage on the US Air Force. This
should cause the US government and Nixon himself to reflect. We intend
to resolve the American POW issue in the following manner:
1. The US government must demonstrate compliance, i.e. a cease fire
and the removal of Nguyen Van Thieu, and then both sides can begin
discussing the matter of returning POWs to the Nixon government.
2. While the American side is resolving the above-mentioned problems,
we can free several more aviators from the number who are
progressively inclined. Nixon should not hinder the return of these
aviators to their homeland and not undertake any disciplinary measures
toward them.
3. Nixon must compensate North Vietnam for the great damage inflicted
on it by this destructive war.
Here then are the principles on the bases of which we may resolve the
American POW issue. However, Nixon continues to resist resolving the
Vietnamesse question, thereby delaying the resolution of the American
POW issue.
I have reported these specific figures and fundamental aspecrs of the
American POW issue to the Politburo. But we also have these comrades
who do not understand this problem correctly. It is necessary to
resolve this issue taking into account settling the military and the
political aspects of the Vietnamese problem. If we take a path of
concession toward Americans and release POWs, then we would lose much.
That is why our point of view on this issue remains the same: this
issue must be resolved on the basis of military and political aspects
of settlement.
Holding 1205 POWs creates certain difficulties for us, but more
importantly, the loss of 1205 POWs, particularly aviators, is a great
detriment to the American Army, particularly the US Air Force. At the
same time, we were able to collect data about American weaponry,
tactical/technical characteristics of aircraft, Air Force directives,
as well as materials about to uncover US intentions in the
international arena and on a number of other issues which are related
to war in Indochina.
That is why we are convinced that our position concerning POWs has and
continues to be correct. If we could successfully resolve the POW
issue, then the other issues would not exert any concentrating on the
successful resolution of this problem on the aviators who were shot
down over North Vietnam and American specialist, as well as scientists
in other technical areas. Their loss is a major liability for the
American Army, because in no other war have there been so many
captured Americans as there are in this war of aggression.
The 1205 American POWs kept in the prisons of North Vietnam present a
large number. For now, we have officially published a list of only 368
POWs. The resst are not acknowledged. The US government is aware of
this, but they do not know the exact number of POWs, or they perhaps
only assume an approximate number based on their lossess. Therefore in
accordance with the instructions from the Poliburo, we are keeping the
number of POWs secret.
We are continuing to collect and study materials from interrogations
of POWs in order to have a basis in specific circumstances to expose
US designs in the Indochina war of aggresstion as well as in other
matters. Collection and study of these materials has provided us great
assistance in studing the scientific discoveries of the USA, in
developing methods to cunter contemporary weapons, including chemical,
which have inflicted great harm upon us in this war.
I reported to the Politburo several fundamental aspectrs related to
the matter of American POWs, namely: concerning the policy we are
implementing on this matter, I gave the concrete number of American
POWs seized in North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.
We still have among us Comrades who think: why do we keep these POWs
and not take advantage of the Nixon proposals? Do we really want to
resolve this matter after all? It needs to be noted that such a point
of view is profoundly mistaken. This is not political horse-trading
but rather an important condition and serious argument for successful
resolution of the Vietnam problem. That is why the matter of the
American POWs has great significance in exposing Nixon's designs in
this matter and condemn individualistic mistaken views current among
us on this matter. We firmly hold to our position - - when the
American government resolves the political and military issues on all
three fronts of Indochina, we will set free all American POWs. We
consider this a very correct course.
Dear Comrades!
I have reported the following matters to Politburo sessions: the
course of our party on the general offensive conducted in South
Vietnam from March 30th to the present; our errors and deficiencies in
the offensive and summing up results of the offensive in South
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia; positive and negative things taking place
in the course of the offensive; short term plans of the enemy and our
operations; analysis of errors permitted in strategic and tactical
leadership; our contacts with political figures of South Vietnam from
the Saigon regime; the matter of American POWs, captured on the three
fronts of Indochina.
Today on assignment of the Supreme Command, the State Defense Council
and the Military Committee of the Politburo, I reported to you on
these matters so that the Politburo could stufy these problems, could
express its opinion on them, and set forth forms and methods for their
resolution. Soon, the State Defense Council, together with the Supreme
Command will study matters related to carrying out new operations at
the front. The State Defense Council assigned the Supreme Command, and
later in turn the General Staff, to address matters related to the
development of new military plans for the year 1973. At the present
time these plans are being worked out with the goal of preparing the
necessary forces for their implementation. We are occupied with
matters of mobilization and traingin of reinforcements for two or
three Indochinese fronts. We should mobilize 250,000 men 200,000 of
which would be sent to South Vietnam and 50,000 to Laos and Cambodia.
Summing up this report it is necessary to say that I have touched on
the fundamental features of the developing conditions in South
Vietnam, on our difficulties and successes, and also on the
difficulties existing for the enemy. I set out our plans and our
course, illuminating also a series of matters which the Politburo
assigned to the State Defese Council and Supreme Command. At the next
Politburo session I shall set forth matters touching upon the present
sit necessary to understand that the outcome of the coming battle
depends upon the solution of these important questions. It is
necessary to attain a clear understanding among the generals of the
fact that the Thieu regime never will employ popular support and
cannot exist. Such are the fundamental questions which we should
resolve in the near future.
>From the utterances of the generals set forth above, we see that the
situation is developing in a direction gavorable to expand the net of
communicatioons and connections with people who will carry out Plan
"BA BE." The Supreme Command and Ministry of State Security discussed
all matters related to successful implementation of this plan and
levied new tasks upon the commands of the combat zones responsible for
implementation of all regions and now are conducting the final work in
order to complete preparatroy measures for this Plan by September 30th
of this year. In comparison to other plans, the preparatioon of Plan
"BA BE" is developing will. Such a plan we will formost ring into
being on the territory of South Vietnam. In the course of its
realization we will acquire experience which can help us counter the
designs of the enemy at the front.
However more cruel the bombings and barrages of the enemy may become,
so much greater the victory we should grasp at the front, just such
victories ais realization of Plan "BA BE." With the implementation of
this plan we join great hopes; especially in accelerating the pace at
which the offensive at the front develops, of which I reported to you
above. The favorable development of the situation will be a huge and
significant factor in collapse of military desgns of the USA and of
the puppets at the front in South Vietnam. We must thwart the
tickheaded and treacherous plans of the enemy, successful carrying out
of Plan "BA BE" will indeed help us to grasp new victories. These
victories will have great strategic significance in implementation of
Plans T8-6 and 1) Plan S-6, which were topics above.
(I) Plan S-6 - - Plan for military operations in the Saigon region
(footnote of the GRU)
The goal of Plan "BA BE" is introduction of division into the ranks of
the enemy and lowering of his will to resist. Successful
implementation of Plan "BA BE" will help us to attain successes at the
Paris negotiations on Vietnam. The closer is victory, so much more
clearly will appear the treacherous designs of the
Nixon-Kissinger-Laird clique, and likewise of the puppet government of
Nguyen Van Thieu. Therefore implementation of Plan "BA BE" will be
great step in the resolution of many issues in the current situation.
Because of this, its significance is so great.
For successful realization of this plan we should as so as possible
deploy our forces, in order to approach implementation of this plan in
the month of October in accordance with indicated deadlines.
In the Paris negotiations on Vietnam we have met in recent days with a
series of difficulites. These difficulites are explained by the fact
that Nixon begin stubborn as before and is trying above all to achieve
amilitary solution of the issu and only then to move to settlement of
political issues, which exercises great influence on the course of
developement of the situation in Vietnam. As a result of the exchange
of opions in the private meetings with Nixon's advisor, Kissinger, we
understood that Nixon as before is being stubborn on settling the
situation which is developing today in Vietnam. To attain settlement
we should conduct careful preparation to counter Nixon's designs. Let
him understand: if he does not renounce this war, then precisely the
USA will suffer defeat in it. However, Nixon is being stubborn in
continuing aggressive war and maintaining the status quo. That is why
we think, that with the USA taking such a position, peaceful solution
of the Vietnamese question is not possible. We see that the USA
obstinately continues aggression, while Nguyen Van thieu as before
holds to his insolent position. That is why we are filled with
resolution to carry out Plan "BA BE," the realization of which will be
a turning point in the settlement of the situation at the front.
This would be our first military thrust on the front aimed at
resolving the complicated political issue at the present stage. Until
this, the Supreme Command had never tried woking out a plan simial to
the plan "Ba Be".
Over the course of Six months, we prepared to execute this plan.
During this time, we gathered everyone who should take part in its
realization, and then conducted a thorough traingin with them. The
intelligence directorate of the Ministry of National Defence and the
Ministry of State Security conducted the training of these people. We
well understand that the better the training of these people is
conducted, the fewer the losses we will carry and the faster we will
be able to attain execution of this plan.
Anonymous
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 6 Nov 1996 14:46:55 -0800
From: "Rudolf Kies, PH.D."
Subject: 1205 Document 3 of 3
Thus, once again evaluating the plan "Ba Be", the thorough training
which is now going on, and which will be realized jointly with the
plan T8-6 in October, it can be said that its successful
realizationwill assist us to attain new large victories at the Paris
negotiations on Vietnam. These are very serious issues which we must
devote constant attention to.
Yesterday the State Defense Council directed the Supreme Command to
conduct a conference for the cadres responsible for traingin and
carrying out his plan. At this conference, the forms, means and
methods were stated, which were worked out. According to the organs
and confirmed at a Politburo session.
Now we can say that we have achieved great successes and we are
convinced that this plan will be realized. Presently, this plan is
being carried out. We have already suceeded in inserting a protion of
our comrades into South Vietnamese territory. We succeeded with
difficulty in certain areas and for this we had to procure all
possible means. In other areas, this operation was carried out more
successfully, and now our people are occuping stable positions in the
puppet governing apparatus.
Dear Comrades! In summing up what is stated above, it can be said that
we are going in the right direction in carrying out our plans,
especially the plans T8-6 and "Ba Be", and also in training for the
realization of our plan s-6, the realization of which is stated for
the near future.
In addition to these issues, in accordance with the instructions from
the Politburo, I will also report to you today on American POWs
captured on the various fronts of Indochina.
The work with American prisoners of war has always been within the
field of vision of the Politburo and has been reflected in its
decisions, such as decision No. 21 DST Dated 23 Mar 71, and decision
No. 21 E dated 4 Apr 72. Both of these decisions concern the issues of
exploiting these American POW issue. Some of these are correct, other
are not, but even among us there are a number of comradeswhose
opinions differ from the opionion of Politburo. These comrades are not
taking into consideration the particulars of the developing situation
not the inherent difficulties in their judgements. These opinion harm
us in our search for methods of resolving the American POW issue.
Dear comrades! The American POW issue to very complex. The peoples of
the world [world opinion] and the peoples of our fraternal socialist
nations [allied popular opinion] as well as North Vietnam. Allow me to
inform you specifically on this matter. We have captured a very large
number of American POWs on the fronts of Indochina since the time that
the US introduced their troops into Vietnam, escalated the air war
against North Vietnam, and expanded the total scope of their
appreassion by spreading this aggression onto the territories of Laos
and Cambodia. At first, the number of American POWs was not large and
world public opinion paid little attention to them. The number of
Americal POWs in North Vietnam grew day by day after 5 Aug 65 when the
US imperialists started massive air bombing and off-shore bombardment
by the 7th fleet of the territory of North Vietnam, and after having
exxpanded their aggression onto the territories of Laos and Cambodia.
The number of American POWs in the DRV has not been made public to
this day. We have kept this figure secret. At today's Politburo
session, I will report to you, Comrades, the exact number of American
POWs.
For Official Use Only
The total number of American POWs captured to date on the fronts of
Indochina, ie in North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia,
comprises 1205 people. Of them, 671 people were captured in North
Vietnam and 143 aviators [were captured] in South Vietnam. This means
the total number of aviators, and diversionists (special operations)
(American advisors on diversionary ships and divers), captured on the
territories of North and South Vietnam comprises 814 people. In
addition, from other categories of American servicemen in Indochina,
we have captured 391 people, including: 283 in South Vietnam, 65 in
Cambodia and 43 in Laos; 814 and 391 comprises 1205 people.
Here is more data on the 1205 POWs.
We have captured 624 American aviators in North Vietnam, to include 7
colonels, 85 lieutenant colonels, 183 majors, ie the total number of
senior US Air Force and Navy officiers comprises 275 people. The 624
American aviators include 3 astronauts, i.e. three people who have
completed the necessary training for space flight, for instance, Jim
Katlo, who was captured in the vicinity of Hanoi. This figure also
includes 15 US Air Force aces having more than 4000 flight hours each:
Norman Klarvisto, Karmet, Jim Intist Shasht and others. This is the
specific data on American aviators captured in North Vietnam.
Among the other 47 prisoners captured in North Vietnam, there are 36
advisors of diversionary detachments who were inserted in the border
region between the DRV and Laos; lone diversionists who were
conducting reconnaissance ships; and several seamen who abandoned
their ships that were damaged and whom we picked up. Therefore the
figures 624 and 47 add up to 671.
In South Vietnam we have captured 143 US aircrew members, mainly
helicopter aviators and some jet aviators.
Among the 391 American POWs captured in South Vietnam, Laos and
Cambodia, we have 9 colonels, 19 lieutenant colonels and 52 majors.
The remaining officers are captain and below, as well as American
enlisted soldiers.
Thus in summary, I want to remind you again that the 1205 American
POWs presently in prisons of North Vietnam include:
-624 aviators captured in North Vietnam
-143 aviators captured in South Vietnam
-47 diversionarists and other American servicemen captured in North
Vietnam;
-391 American servicemen of other categories, which includes 283
captured in South Vietnam, 65 in Cambodia, and 43 in Laos.
All of them are presently in prisons in North Vietnam. Currently we
have 11 prisons where American POWs are held. We used to have 4 large
prisons, however after the American attempt to free their POWs from
Kha-Tej (Son Tay) we expanded this number to 11. Each prison holds
approximately 100 POWs.
Seven Air Force colonels captured in North Vietnam and nine colonels
of various branches of service captured in South Vietnam, Laos and
Cambodia (16 officers in all) are being held together; through them,
we are attempting to gain an understanding of the current situation
which has developed in the American Army, extract the material and
information we need, and determine our position toward them.
We are also holding 104 American lieutenant colonels in one location
and are attempting to extract information - secret information about
troop dispositions and information concerning the US Defense
Department from them.
We have 235 majors concentrated in two locations.
Thus we have dedicated special prisons for senior officers af the
American Army: one for colonels, one for lieutenant colonels and two
for majors. The rest of the POWs, captains and below, were placed in
other prisons.
A few words about the political views and attitudes of American POWs.
There are 368 POWs who have progressive attitudes.
They understand very well that this war is unjust and unpopular on
their part. They condemn the American administration and express a
strong protest against this war. We will be able to release these 368
POWs first, if as a result of the struggle of the progressive peoples
of the world, including the American people, a favorable international
environment will develop, forcing Nixon to move toward a resolution of
the political issue. We are carrying out work with this catergory of
POWs to explain to them the aggressive nature of the war being
conducted by the regime, and also to make them understand the unjust
character of this war which is inflicting great damage on the American
people. One can assert that this group of POWs is progressive in their
political views.
There are 372 of the POWs who hold neutral views, i.e. their political
outlook is not fully progressive, yet not too reactionary. We plainly
see that they still do not clearly understand the role of the American
administration in unleashing the aggressive war in Indochina.
The remainder of the POWs hold reactionary views. In spite of the work
carried on to explain to them the real state of things, they have not
changed their reactionary views.
The following is a summation:
- - 368 POWs holding progressive views can be released first;
- - 372 POWs hold neutral positions;
- - 465 POWs hold reactionary views.
All the POWs among the senior officers hold reactionary views, i.e.
they do not condemn Nixon, they do not protest his policies, and they
distort our course of action. We understand that these officers come
from rich families. Their reactionary views are precisely a result of
this.
We well understand that the American POW issue has great significance
for the resolution of the South Vietnamese problem. We must continue
propagandistic and educational work with the American POWs, leading to
their understanding of the nature of the aggressive war which the US
is carrying out in Vietnam, as well as the senseless obstinateness of
Nixon, which only delays the release of POWs and their return to their
homeland. Soon we will free several POWs in order to put pressure on
the Nixon administration, observe this reaction and the reaction of
the American public, as well as to demonstrate our good intentions in
this matter.
Thus, the 1205 American POWs captured on the fronts of Indochina (in
North and South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia), presently kept in prisons
in North Vietnam represent a significant force in the American army, a
basic part of which is made up of American aviators.
The large number of American aviators imprisoned during the time of
Johnson and Nixon inflicted huge damage on the US Air Force. This
should cause the US government and Nixon himself to reflect. We intend
to resolve the American POW issue in the following manner:
1. The US government must demonstrate compliance, i.e. a cease fire
and the removal of Nguyen Van Thieu, and then both sides can begin
discussing the matter of returning POWs to the Nixon government.
2. While the American side is resolving the above-mentioned problems,
we can free several more aviators from the number who are
progressively inclined. Nixon should not hinder the return of these
aviators to their homeland and not undertake any disciplinary measures
toward them.
3. Nixon must compensate North Vietnam for the great damage inflicted
on it by this destructive war.
Here then are the principles on the bases of which we may resolve the
American POW issue. However, Nixon continues to resist resolving the
Vietnamesse question, thereby delaying the resolution of the American
POW issue.
I have reported these specific figures and fundamental aspects of the
American POW issue to the Politburo. But we also have these comrades
who do not understand this problem correctly. is necessary to resolve
this issue taking into account settling the military and the political
aspects of the Vietnamese problem. If we take a path of concession
toward Americans and release POWs, then we would lose much. That is
why our point of view on this issue remains the same: this issue must
be resolved on the basis of military and political aspects of
settlement.
Holding 1205 POWs creates certain difficulties for us, but more
importantly, the loss of 1205 POWs, particularly aviators, is a great
detriment to the American Army, particularly the US Air Force. At the
same time, we were able to collect data about American weaponry,
tactical/technical characteristics of aircraft, Air Force directives,
as well as materials about to uncover US intentions in the
international arena and on a number of other issues which are related
to war in Indochina.
That is why we are convinced that our position concerning POWs has and
continues to be correct. If we could successfully resolve the POW
issue, then the other issues would not exert any concentrating on the
successful resolution of this problem on the aviators who were shot
down over North Vietnam and American specialist, as well as scientists
in other technical areas. Their loss is a major liability for the
American Army, because in no other war have there been so many
captured Americans as there are in this war of aggression.
The 1205 American POWs kept in the prisons of North Vietnam present a
large number. For now, we have officially published a list of only 368
POWs. The resst are not acknowledged. The US government is aware of
this, but they do not know the exact number of POWs, or they perhaps
only assume an approximate number based on their lossess. Therefore in
accordance with the instructions from the Poliburo, we are keeping the
number of POWs secret.
We are continuing to collect and study materials from interrogations
of POWs in order to have a basis in specific circumstances to expose
US designs in the Indochina war of aggresstion as well as in other
matters. Collection and study of these materials has provided us great
assistance in studing the scientific discoveries of the USA, in
developing methods to cunter contemporary weapons, including chemical,
which have inflicted great harm upon us in this war.
I reported to the Politburo several fundamental aspectrs related to
the matter of American POWs, namely: concerning the policy we are
implementing on this matter, I gave the concrete number of American
POWs seized in North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.
We still have among us Comrades who think: why do we keep these POWs
and not take advantage of the Nixon proposals? Do we really want to
resolve this matter after all? It needs to be noted that such a point
of view is profoundly mistaken. This is not political horse-trading
but rather an important condition and serious argument for successful
resolution of the Vietnam problem. That is why the matter of the
American POWs has great significance in exposing Nixon's designs in
this matter and condemn individualistic mistaken views current among
us on this matter. We firmly hold to our position - - when the
American government resolves the political and military issues on all
three fronts of Indochina, we will set free all American POWs. We
consider this a very correct course.
Dear Comrades!
I have reported the following matters to Politburo sessions: the
course of our party on the general offensive conducted in South
Vietnam from March 30th to the present; our errors and deficiencies in
the offensive and summing up results of the offensive in South
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia; positive and negative things taking place
in the course of the offensive; short term plans of the enemy and our
operations; analysis of errors permitted in strategic and tactical
leadership; our contacts with political figures of South Vietnam from
the Saigon regime; the matter of American POWs, captured on the three
fronts of Indochina.
Today on assignment of the Supreme Command, the State Defense Council
and the Military Committee of the Politburo, I reported to you on
these matters so that the Politburo could study these problems, could
express its opinion on them, and set forth forms and methods for their
resolution. Soon, the State Defense Council, together with the Supreme
Command will study matters related to carrying out new operations at
the front. The State Defense Council assigned the Supreme Command, and
later in turn the General Staff, to address matters related to the
development of new military plans for the year 1973. At the present
time these plans are being worked out with the goal of preparing the
necessary forces for their implementation. We are occupied with
matters of mobilization and training of reinforcements for two or
three Indochinese fronts. We should mobilize 250,000 men 200,000 of
which would be sent to South Vietnam and 50,000 to Laos and Cambodia.
Summing up this report it is necessary to say that I have touched on
the fundamental features of the developing conditions in South
Vietnam, on our difficulties and successes, and also on the
difficulties existing for the enemy. I set out our plans and our
course, illuminating also a series of matters which the Politburo
assigned to the State Defese Council and Supreme Command. At the next
Politburo session I shall set forth matters touching upon the present
situation in Laos and Cambodia and views on its development.
Presently the situation is turnig out quite favorable. The peoples of
South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia have decisively frustrated the plan
for "Vietnamization" of the war and identical plans being implemented
in Laos and Cambodia. We hold high the invincible banner of
Marxism-Leninism!
We are carrying out the precepts of Ho Chi Minh. The war of resistance
against American imperialists for the salvation of the Fatherland will
yet be stubborn and hard, yet we will definitely grasp victory. We
will decisively frustate the plans of Nixon or anyone who takes his
place and continues the aggresive war!
The course of our party is assuredly correct. Our people are heroic
people. Our forces are heroic forces!
The three countries of Indochina, closely united one with another,
will fight to the last drop of blood for the freedom and independence
of their Fatherlands. The Vietnamese people will fully carry out its
international duty toward the fraternal peoples of Laos and Cambodia!
To the current session of the Politburo I wish successful work. I have
completed the presentation of the report.
Anonymous
Rudolf Kies, PH.D.
Owner/Moderator
on listserv@sjuvm.stjohns.edu
We don't spy on anyone - we just watch those that do...
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 6 Nov 1996 13:27:13 -0600
From: Jason Thomas
Subject: Re: Terrorism.
You're absolutely right: there are no easy answers. And I certainly did
not mean to insinuate that the problem stems entirely from islamic
groups; it's just that Mr. Mcgehee was referring to INTERNATIONAL
terrorism. I don't even want to think about the domestic variety.
Either way, you're facing Hobson's choice with regards to balancing
morality and national security. On the one hand, you have safety of
people and airports. On the other hand, you have the very freedoms that
you are trying to protect. Domestic terrorism is such a sticky issue
that I don't see any way to stop it other than control of information
and draconian proactive law enforcement.
A problem with reprisals that you did not mention is the possibility of
parties using them as dragons teeth; "framing" a nation and directing
repercussions against it. One thing I was trying to say is that while
we technically have the option of doing such things as bombing villages
and training camps, it is neither politically nor morally feasible.
It's very easy to undermine the ideas of others when you aren't
advancing any of your own. Do benefit us with some of your knowledge
and experience. Your posting, though quite ascerbic, does seem to
demonstrate some glimmer of original thought.
Regards,
Jason Thomas